Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 248 - Increase in penalties for drug-related offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. In fact, I have two points of order, the first of which is a matter of self-interest. You have understandably excluded amendments tabled yesterday from your provisional selection list, but I should be grateful if you would at least consider including them. To be honest, the only reason that I did not table my amendments the day before yesterday was that the House rose early and we were ''caught short''. I understand that it may not be possible to reconsider the issue now, and I am not labouring the point. Indeed, some of the amendments deal with matters that can be raised in the debate, and I make my request simply because you have the option to include them.
 I turn now to the second point of order. In the light of the request that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) and I made on Tuesday, can the Minister tell us whether any material is available for distribution to help us with the Government amendments that we are about to debate? Understandably, many will be small and incidental, but with lists as long as that in schedule 21, we must follow matters carefully, as we always do, to ensure that we do not miss anything. It would therefore be helpful to have something that explained the provisions.

Eric Illsley: The second point of order is not a matter for the Chair, but I am sure that the Minister is listening. If material is available, I am sure that the Government will make it available during this morning's proceedings.
 The first point of order is a matter for me. As I explained to the Committee on 17 December, my co-Chairman and I will not, as a general rule, call starred amendments, including any that may be reached during an afternoon sitting of the Committee. I have considerable sympathy with the hon. Gentleman because the early Adjournment of the House on Tuesday precluded some hon. Members from tabling amendments and, indeed, parliamentary questions. However, the hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity in the debate to make the points that he wanted to raise in his amendments. Having reconsidered the issue, therefore, I am not prepared to accept the starred amendments.

Simon Hughes: Thank you for your courteous ruling on my points of order, Mr. Illsley.
 The clause is very straightforward and introduces schedule 20, which we shall debate next. It says that increases in penalties for certain drug-related offences ''shall have effect'', and those increases are set out in the schedule. It is right to raise general issues of principle now, rather than to wait for them to come up under the schedule, where it would be impossible logically to make the argument. 
 The clause relates to penalties for drugs offences and to the drugs policy that the Government have announced. The Committee has debated that policy substantially on one occasion and incidentally on others, prompted not least by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) and others. That takes us back to one of the important secondary themes of the Bill: how we should deal with drugs matters. 
 First, I have a straightforward question, which the Minister might helpfully answer now, as he was unable to answer it when we debated drugs previously. Will he tell the Committee the date, accurate or approximate, when the Home Secretary proposes to change the classification of cannabis from a class B to a class C drug in line with his announcement last year and following the advice of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs? We know that that is in the pipeline. My understanding is that, whatever the date, the change will take effect immediately, once it has been agreed by Parliament. I am not aware that the decision can be deferred, but I am conscious that an order is necessary for the change to go ahead, so clarification of the process would be helpful. 
 In relation to the substance, schedule 20—I hope that you will excuse me for referring to it now, Mr. Illsley, but I shall not seek to have a debate on schedule 20 later—would amend schedule 4 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 as follows. In relation to class C drugs, wherever the maximum term of imprisonment is five years the Government propose that it should be increased to 14 years. Paragraph 1(3) of schedule 20 sets out the offences to which the increased term will apply. It is only a short list, so I shall read it. 
''(a) section 4(2) (production, or being concerned in the production, of a controlled drug),
(b) section 4(3) (supplying or offering to supply a controlled drug or being concerned in the doing of either activity by another),
(c) section 5(3) (having possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another),
(d) section 8 (being the occupier, or concerned in the management, of premises and permitting or suffering certain activities to take place there),
(e) section 12(6) (contravention of direction prohibiting practitioner etc from possessing, supplying etc controlled drugs), and
(f) section 13(3) (contravention of direction prohibiting practitioner etc from prescribing, supplying etc controlled drugs).''
 The proposal would affect just two other laws by increasing maximum punishments. The first is the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. The offence is the offence in schedule 1 to that Act: 
''controlled drugs: variation of punishments for certain offences under that Act''
 and deals with 
''punishment on conviction on indictment of offences under that Act committed in relation to Class C drugs''.
 So Customs legislation would be changed to make the maximum term of imprisonment 14, rather than five, years. 
 Lastly, the proposal will change section 19 of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, which relates to ships used for illicit traffic. Punishment on conviction on indictment of offences under that section committed in relation to class C drugs will be increased from five years to 14. That is five Misuse of Drugs Act offences and two others, for which the proposal would increase the maximum sentence from five years to 14 years. 
 My colleagues and I have made our views on the issue clear. Public policy should clearly differentiate between drugs in each of the three classes. Whether colleagues in Committee take an identical view to that of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and me about whether it is right to imprison people for possession or not, there is a separate argument that we should be careful not to give the same signals with regard to penalties in relation to class C drugs as we give in relation to class A and B drugs. 
 On one hand, the Government are concerned to move and to be more realistic and progressive, which I welcome. The Home Secretary was willing to make that move, which was not made by the first Labour Administration. On the other hand, the Government do not want to appear soft, which I also understand. I understand the genesis of, and the thinking behind, the policy. However, a danger of the proposal that emanates from those considerations is that there will be a muddled policy that will muddy the water rather than give a straightforward message. Dealing in class A drugs, which include dangerous, addictive drugs such as heroin and crack cocaine, is the most undesirable offence, for which one can expect the harshest treatment. Dealing in class B drugs is dangerous, but not as dangerous as class A drugs. Class C drugs are still dangerous but not nearly as dangerous as class B drugs. That is the basis of the classification system. If those are the messages that we want to get down to the streets, the maximum prison sentences should follow in gradated severity. It is nonsense to increase the maximum prison sentence—what the statute book says could be the punishment for an offence—so that it is comparable to a sentence for an offence relating to class A and class B drugs. 
 Another consideration is that the provisions are intended to deal with people who are dealing and trafficking in drugs as opposed to people who use them. I do not argue against provisions that might provide for severe punishment of people who traffic in class C drugs. Society should be careful to give a discipline to people who misuse their position as general practitioners—two of the offences detailed by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 are meant to deal with that—to people who prescribe improperly, and to people who not only turn a blind eye to, but become aiders and abetters to, a trade in drugs when they are running a hostel, which the provisions also cover. I appreciate that, so the argument is not about whether 
 there should be no prospective penal response, but about the level of that response. I seek to persuade the Committee that the danger with the drafting of the clause and schedule 20, which would change the maximum period of imprisonment from five years to 14 years, is that people dealing in cannabis, benzodiazapine or anabolic steroids will prospectively be in the same league as those dealing in crack cocaine or heroin. The courts of course have discretion, but it should be across a narrower band of prospective punishments than one that takes people up to 14 years. 
 The amendments that, for understandable reasons, you said that you could not select, Mr. Illsley—although that does not preclude me from making my point—suggested that the right maximum period might be four years. That was a cockshy in one sense, but it was also an attempt to fix a maximum period that would be less than the present five years, while recognising that there might be an argument for punishing people who are not dealers, even in the least serious illegal drugs, with that lesser maximum punishment, which would, again, send out a signal. 
 I propose that the Committee would do better to remove clause 248 and schedule 20. We should replace the schedule with one setting a maximum of four years or a similar sentence. There is no theology about four years, and it would be a relatively appropriate maximum tariff, given that the maximum sentence for trafficking in class A drugs is 14 years. 
 I am also well aware of the controversy that arose over the section 8 offence of 
''being the occupier, or concerned in the management, of premises and permitting or suffering certain activities''.
 The people who became known as the Cambridge Two were tried and convicted of that offence. They managed a hostel for the homeless in Cambridge that dealt with people who, among other problems, had drug addictions. They were convicted because they knew what was going on at the hostel but failed to control it. I have not met the two people or been to the hostel, so I speak from what I have read rather than from direct experience. However, their conviction appeared to be a harsh response to something that, although not an unwitting risk, was inevitable if one manages such premises. The danger of a maximum penalty of 14 years is that the courts could send a message that would be entirely out of proportion to sentences for people dealing in class A or class B drugs. 
 It would be helpful if the Minister could answer the questions that I asked at the beginning of my intervention about the Government's plans to downgrade cannabis to class C. It would be helpful if he would confirm that if my colleagues and I, and Parliament as a whole, fail to persuade the Government that clause 248 and schedule 20 should only come into effect at the same time as the change in the classification of cannabis. They should be seen as a pair of propositions. 
 It would be even more helpful if the Minister could respond to concerns that the penalty appears to be a disproportionate response to those using class C drugs. 
 I ask him to set out as fully as he can the justification for the penalty for class C drug offences. Cannabis will be included in that category in future. It is thought to be in the least serious category, so why should there be an almost threefold increase in the maximum punishment? Why should the maximum punishment therefore be as severe as that for the hardest drugs that are available? 
 I end by saying that I am aware that the Crown Prosecution Service will sometimes bring a charge for a lesser offence because it does not have the evidence for the more serious offence. People can often be prosecuted for possession when the prosecutors would like to prosecute them for dealing. 
 That raises the question of people who are caught in possession of an amount of drugs that it is illogical to suppose is an amount that they can have for personal use. The Minister has heard me say, and I assume that he remembers other hon. Members saying, that some of us believe that there is a strong case for creating a new offence of substantial possession. That is a proposition put by, among others, the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe). If a person was caught with more drugs than anyone could reasonably use himself, he should be able to be nicked for a more serious offence than possession for his own use. 
 The benefit would be that it would be possible to stop the games—not mischievous and awful games, but games none the less—that are played when people are charged with one offence and another is implied. The prosecution may try, in putting their case, to show that the person before the court on a possession charge is really there because the quantity of drugs that was found leads to an assumption that he is a dealer, but there is no evidence for that, so a charge has not been brought. An intermediate step could be made available. 
 If that were part of the Government's package, it would deal with some of the concerns that are answered, wrongly in our view, by the extraordinarily large increase in maximum penalties under clause 248 and schedule 20. I hope that before the Bill is passed the Government will rethink the matter. They should not give a message that cannabis use is less serious than heroin and cocaine use while setting the same maximum penalty for dealing in both. That is an inconsistent message.

Hilary Benn: It is not the same.

Simon Hughes: There are maximums of more than 14 years—I appreciate that—but the maximum for class C drugs is certainly being brought level with that for class B drugs, which would be 14 years. Class A drugs may have higher maximums, but if grading according to severity is done for all other purposes, it should be done also for the purpose of the clause. I hope that the Minister will accept that straightforward proposition, which is consistent with the Government's argument for changing the law on cannabis possession.

Eric Illsley: Order. We are debating clause 248 and we have strayed into the territory of schedule 20. I shall allow the debate to continue as though we are debating the two together, and I shall put the question on schedule 20 forthwith when we reach it.

Humfrey Malins: On a point of order, Mr. Illsley, I am grateful for you guidance on that, because several of us wanted to comment on schedule 20 and felt that it would have been appropriate to restrict our remarks to the point in our proceedings when we reached it. Perhaps that is too simple an approach. However, I take it that you are telling members of the Committee that if they want to make any remarks on schedule 20, they should not make them in a debate on schedule 20, but in this debate on clause 248. Is that right?

Eric Illsley: The point that I am making arises from the fact that the debate has strayed into the content of schedule 20. So as not to take up time and so that the Minister will not have to respond twice on issues that are covered by schedule 20, any hon. Member who wants to raise points for debate on schedule 20 should do so now. I shall allow that leeway.

Dominic Grieve: It is always interesting to listen to the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) in discursive and philosophical vein. It would be something of an achievement to be discursive and philosophical on clause 248 alone, seeing that the explanatory note states quite succinctly:
''This clause introduces Schedule 20.''
 On its own, it did not seem to present subject matter for a great deal of discussion. 
 It seemed to me also—and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me—that the discursive and philosophical nature of his contribution probably did not go to the heart of the issue. The purpose of schedule 20, as I see it, is to get the Government out of the fix in which they have located themselves by reducing cannabis to the status of a class C drug, and having to work through the consequences of that. If I am wrong in that and there is a wider issue informing the schedule, I shall be happy to hear about it from the Minister. 
 I am not aware of there having been massive pressure, prior to the reclassification of cannabis, for the raising of the maximum sentences for producing or being involved in the sale of class C drugs. If I am wrong about that, or there have been expressions of view by the judiciary that the five-year maximum sentence has proved to be insufficient, I have not heard about it. Practising, as I do, at the Bar, one picks up the flavour of what is being said. Sometimes one hears that it is felt to be ridiculous that a sentence for something is five years. I have not heard that in all my time in practice, and I have done a great deal of drug-related work. I can only assume that the basis for the change is the reclassification of cannabis to a class C drug—the Government have got their knickers in a twist and in order to get them out of it, they have gone through a convoluted process by which, having reduced cannabis to a class C drug, they have had to 
 change it into an arrestable offence and to raise the penalties for involvement in pushing or production up to the levels that apply to much more dangerous drugs. 
 I would be delighted if the Minister would explain the background to the decision. It is an example of what happens when government ceases to be joined up and starts to respond to different pressures from different interest groups and we end up with a complete mess.

James Clappison: I am listening carefully to the important points made by my hon. Friend. He mentioned that the increase in penalties for class C offences would take them up to the same level as those for class A drugs. Can he give an example?

Dominic Grieve: Well, a 14-year penalty for production would, I think, be the same as that for a class B drug. The penalty for a class A drug is more substantial. We considered earlier on the sorts of drugs that are in class C. I remember reciting them to the Minister in the context of the Auntie Vera comment about the circumstances in which people might have class C drugs in their pockets. I pointed out that they included many drugs that are legitimately available on prescription but that a person might have in his possession although they had not been prescribed. It is possible that such drugs might be produced and sold illicitly, although I doubt it, and the imposition of a 14-year sentence needs to be justified by the Government.
 The law should respond to circumstance. If there is a problem with a particular activity, sentences might have to be increased. However, to increase a maximum sentence from five to 14 years for something that, hitherto, has not been a major problem strikes me as bizarre. Perhaps the Minister can justify it in relation to cannabis. If somebody imports or produces cannabis worth £2 million—making it into an industry—the scale might justify our saying that a five-year sentence is insufficient. However, for the majority, if not the entirety of the drugs that previously made up the category of class C, a 14-year maximum sentence is absurd. If I am wrong, and the Minister can give concrete examples, other than cannabis, in which it has been required or suggested by the judiciary or the Judicial Studies Board, I shall be only too pleased. I believe that the Government have got into a mess and are adopting a foolish means of getting out of it.

Humfrey Malins: When I am in this Committee Room, I often have the distinct feeling that I am in a world detached from reality. Most people in the real world outside who studied our debate would probably say that toughening up the law is no substitute for effective policing and proper law enforcement. We could couple that belief with a rhetorical question: how many times in the past five years has a court in the United Kingdom imposed a maximum sentence for any drug offence? In my judgment, the answer is zero. So there we are.
 However, let us return for a moment from the real world to our little artificial world. I want to press on a 
 little longer and I have a few specific queries for the Minister. First, as regards categorising drugs, does he accept that heroin and crack cocaine are the two critical ones in the system that cause the most damage? Secondly, does he believe that cocaine, as opposed to crack cocaine, is less of a problem? Thirdly, does he think that ecstasy should be in the same class as crack and heroin? I ask that because the Select Committee on Home Affairs carefully considered classification. Although no one would gainsay the fact that ecstasy is often dangerous, several members of the Select Committee believed—I put the position neutrally—that it was in a different category from heroin and crack cocaine, which are the absolute killers. 
 The next question is, did the Minister read the Home Affairs Committee report, and if so, did he note the proposition that the courts should distinguish between the separate offences of supply of a drug and supply for gain? Members of that Committee were quite vexed by the proposition that a perfectly reasonable youngster who bought half a dozen ecstasy tablets and supplied them to his chums at cost—that is, at no commercial gain—would face the same charge and penalties as those whom we naturally recognise as dealers and who the Committee thought were much more serious criminals. My point is not to remove the criminality from either practice, but to illustrate that the Home Affairs Committee had difficulty with what might be described as social supply. Eventually, we drew a distinction between supply for gain and simply supply. 
 May I—because I never stray from the matter before us, Mr. Illsley—make a point about people who permit drug activities on premises that they are in charge of or manage? My mind immediately turns to prison governors for the simple reason that—the Minister knows this as well as I do—many of us think that there is far too much drug activity in some prisons and a lack of will by some in authority to stamp it out. There are those who tell me anecdotally that some people are far less trouble when they get hold of drugs—I put the point as neutrally as that. 
 If the Minister cannot give me the information today, perhaps he can write to me setting out the steps that the Government have taken in the past 12 months, and those that they propose to take in the next 12 months, to ensure, as we must, that prisons are absolutely drug-free once more.

David Cameron: I believe that the Government are hopelessly muddled over clause 248 and schedule 20, and I agree with the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. I sat on the Home Affairs Committee, and it might be useful if I explain why we thought that it was necessary to reclassify various drugs.
 The Select Committee listened to expert and medical evidence and spoke to the parents of children who had died from drug abuse. We heard many hours of evidence and went into a huge amount of detail. We decided that class A should cover the most serious drugs, particularly heroin and crack 
 cocaine. We decided that ecstasy should be moved from class A to class B. That was a difficult decision, because there have been some high-profile deaths from ecstasy, but all the medical and other evidence that we received suggested that that was the correct classification. 
 Then we decided that cannabis should be moved from class B to class C. There were two reasons for our decision. First, under the Misuse Of Drugs Acts, drugs should be classified according to the danger that they pose, and in order to ascertain that, one must listen carefully to scientific and medical opinion. That is exactly what we did. The second reason is perhaps more controversial. The argument against reclassification is that it may send the wrong signal to young people—that if we move cannabis from class B to class C or move ecstasy from class A to class B, it will send a signal that, somehow, those drugs are okay. The Committee took completely the opposite view that, at the moment, the wrong signal is being sent, because young people are being told that ecstasy is the same class of drug as heroin and cocaine, and cannabis is the same class of drug as other, more dangerous, drugs. Not only is the reclassification scientifically right, but it sends the right signal to young people. 
 I sat in a drugs education class in a school in Wood Green in my constituency. If other hon. Members have not done that, I would recommend it, because it is interesting to see how drugs education programmes work. A policeman came to the class and explained the laws on drugs. He wrote on the blackboard which drugs are in classes A, B and C and what the penalties are. We should not pretend that the way in which drugs are classified does not send out a message, because it does, and we must get that message right. 
 In the second part of the drugs education programme, a former addict explained how he got into drug abuse, how he started on cannabis, then took some pills and ended up on heroin. He described how his life had collapsed, his friends had left him, his family had given up on him and he nearly died. In a very unpreachy, straightforward way, he described his descent into a drugs lifestyle. I have never seen a class of young people being so attentive. They were absolutely fascinated by what they were being told. 
 The Government's policy is terribly muddled, because they are moving cannabis from class B to class C and then massively increasing all the penalties for possession and supply in schedule 20.

James Clappison: My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. Does he agree that once a decision has been taken on the classification of drugs, we should not muddle things by mixing up the consequences of classification?

David Cameron: My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I was going to make that point. There may be a case for saying that, if the Government really want to crack down on the large-scale supply of cannabis, which it should do because it is a large industry, they should take that case and try to do something about it. However, they are using a blunderbuss to hit all class C drugs and offences thereunder, rather than the single rifle shot that is required to deal with cannabis.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If the Government felt that cannabis presented particular problems, should they not have justified their position before the Committee and argued that cannabis requires a separate classification that does not completely wreck the existing class C classification, as their current proposal will?

David Cameron: It would be helpful if the Government could do that, and they have time to do so before Report. I think that the right answer would be for cannabis to be a class C drug, because it would send the right message about the dangers of using the drug, but a separate offence will be needed to deal with the specific problem of large-scale dealing, with a different maximum sentence attached to it.
 I want to take up the point about the other class C drugs. What consultation did the Government hold on suddenly and substantially increasing sentences for the offence of possession of class C drugs? Did they consult pharmacists? Have they talked to doctors? Have they spoken to the various drug charities, such as DrugScope? 
 I have mentioned before my concern on the subject, which arises from the fact that my son has severe epilepsy. As a result of that, I have to store diazepam, temazepam, clobazam, phenobarbitone and phenytoin my fridge. Some of those drugs are held in substantial quantities, particularly the benzodiazepines—valium-style drugs that have a value on the open market. Some drug users like to use them, but they are essential for controlling seizures and fits. Of course, I have a prescription; and I go to the pharmacy to have the prescription made up. What happens next is an ''Auntie Vera'' case. 
 When my Auntie Vera looks after my son, I hand over the necessary drugs, but I do not always have the prescription available to give to her. I see problems arising from that. The Government want to increase substantially the prison sentence for possession with intent to supply. As I have a lot of those drugs, the police might think it a large enough quantity to be possession with intent to supply. My specific question is, what consultation has been held about the change? What problems does the Minister envisage resulting from it? Indeed, is it necessary, given that he could go for a rifle shot rather than a blunderbuss? 
 It seems to me that treating possession as either social supply or supply for gain could provide the answer. When we talk about wanting a severe penalty for dealing in drugs, we want to get those who deal for gain. Perhaps we should differentiate between dealing for gain and simple possession or possession with intent to supply. There is a difference between someone going clubbing with 10 ecstasy tablets, some for himself and some for his friends, and someone with a suitcase full of ecstasy who is dealing and trying to make money out of it. I do not think that the law differentiates between those cases.

John Mann: The hon. Gentleman's scenario would create a grey area. He talks of a clear differentiation between offences at one end of the scale or the other, but there will be a grey area, particularly
 in terms of addiction, of what constitutes dealing for gain.

David Cameron: There is already a grey area. I have already told the Committee of the ex-addict who teaches in schools in Witney. He spends an enormous amount of time in court as an expert witness, explaining how much of a drug one person can take, and therefore whether an offence is simple possession or possession with intent to supply. If the law had a gradation—that is, if it provided for possession with intent to supply, with a separate offence of dealing or supplying for gain, or whatever other variations of offence one could go for—it would be better than the current vague situation, with the one offence of possession with intent to supply.
 The answer could be for the Minister to think about this and to come back and say, ''Yes, cannabis should be a class C drug; yes, there is a problem with cannabis dealing; and yes, we need a new offence of dealing, with a stiff penalty attached to it.'' A more sensible drugs policy would list the various drugs and the different classifications, but it would admit that we have a specific problem with what I might call the cannabis industry and make proposals to deal with it. The current way of doing it does not make sense.

Hilary Benn: This is probably the third time during the course of the Committee's consideration of these matters that we have debated the provisions resulting from the proposal to reclassify cannabis. Subsection (1) introduces schedule 20, which amends schedule 4 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, schedule 1 to the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 and section 19 to the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, to increase—as hon. Members have rightly observed—the maximum penalty for trafficking controlled drugs, which are classified as class C drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act, from five to 14 years' imprisonment. Trafficking includes unlawful importing, supply and possession with intent to supply.
 There are two reasons for the increase. The first follows from the announcement by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in July 2002 of his intention to reclassify cannabis from B to C under the Misuse of Drugs Act. As has been recognised, this measure, which does other things as well, leaves the penalties in relation to cannabis as they are. We should acknowledge that.

Simon Hughes: But it does not just do that. That is the point. At a stroke, it increases the penalties for all the sorts of drugs that the hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) referred to, with no apparent need or justification.

Hilary Benn: If the hon. Gentleman had reflected for a second, he would have realised that I said that it leaves the penalties as they are for cannabis, but it does other things as well. No date has been fixed for implementation, but the intention is to commence reclassification as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent; in other words, to dovetail the two in the manner for which he rightly argued.
 We have heard mention of the Cambridge Two. I stand to be corrected, but as I recollect the case, it related to class A drugs, not class C, so the argument is different from the one that I think the hon. Gentleman was trying to advance. The penalties proposed here in relation to class C are not as severe as those for the most harmful drugs. It might help the Committee if I point out that, for example, on indictment for a class A drug the maximum penalty for a supplier is life or a fine or both, for a class B drug it is 14 years or a fine or both and for a class C drug it is five years or a fine or both. 
 In answer to the questions that the hon. Member for Woking asked, I agree that heroin and crack cocaine are the most critical and that crack is generally more harmful than cocaine. I shall mention ecstasy briefly, as we are not debating its classification and I would be out of order to continue. Ecstasy is in class A, and I have noted the Home Affairs Committee report. The Government's view is that its classification should remain, as it is recognised that it can and does kill suddenly. It is also fair to say that its misuse is a relatively recent development. We do not know a great deal about its potential long-term effects.

David Cameron: I just hope that the Government will keep an open mind about the matter. I fear that they are in the message game. They are worried that reclassifying would send the wrong message. Is the Minister aware that a million ecstasy tablets are taken every weekend? If that is the case, what message is sent to its users if it is in the same category as heroin and cocaine?

Hilary Benn: I accept entirely the point that we need to continue to reflect, as a society, on how we deal with the problem of drugs. That theme has run throughout the consideration of the Bill. The reclassification of cannabis from class B to class C is a consequence of that reflection. I think that it is a sensible step, and no one in the Committee dissents from that view.
 The police have discretion in dealing with someone found in possession of ecstasy tablets, for example, and the courts have a similar discretion. Obviously, someone found in possession of a vast quantity of drugs that they intend to supply to others will face a much more severe sentence than someone who is found to have only a few tablets.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister made the perfectly sensible point that many agree that reclassifying cannabis from class B to class C so that those found in possession of it face a less severe penalty makes eminent sense. However, he must acknowledge that the Government have got themselves into considerable difficulty: reclassifying cannabis creates problems, as suppliers deserve a much higher sentence than is available for a class C drug. However, rather than deal with the matter discretely, the Government have used the blunderbuss of completely altering sentences for class C drugs. That concerns me and other members of the Committee.

Hilary Benn: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's point, and I will deal with it in a moment. The hon. Member for Woking spoke about drug supplying in prisons, and I should tell him that the biggest
 indication of the progress that the Government have made on that is that the percentage of mandatory drugs tests that proved positive halved from 24 per cent. to 11 per cent in the past six years. That shows how seriously the Prison Service takes the issue and the progress that has been made on it.
 The basis for classification is harmfulness, the social effects, consumption and advice from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.

Simon Hughes: Do the Government consider the addictiveness of a drug when deciding on its classification and the penalty for it? Will the Minister confirm that ecstasy is not nearly as addictive as heroin or crack cocaine?

Hilary Benn: We are not debating the classification of ecstasy; we are debating the reclassification of cannabis and the consequential amendments that the Government propose. I acknowledge the argument made by several hon. Members about reclassification. However, the reclassification of cannabis leaves the penalties as they are. There are 10 to 20 cases a year of cannabis trafficking involving amounts of half a tonne or more, and it has been acknowledged that sentences of significantly more than five years' imprisonment have been imposed. The courts must be able to impose substantial sentences in such cases, and the provisions of the Bill will allow them to do precisely that. Serious dealing offences in class C drugs, such as anabolic steroids and benzodiazepines, are exceptional.

Dominic Grieve: This brings us to an important issue concerning drugs such as benzodiazepines and anabolic steroids. Have representations been made to the Government of instances in which the five-year maximum sentence was thought insufficient? Has a judge, for instance, written to the Government to say that that caused him difficulty? I am not aware of its happening, but perhaps the Minister will tell us if it has.

Hilary Benn: I am not aware of such representations having been made. However, I will ask and reply to the hon. Gentleman.

Paul Stinchcombe: As my hon. Friend knows, I am not instinctively in favour of the proposal. However, I should like to know what the tariff sentence is for dealing in cannabis if one is talking about a quantity of 5 tonnes.

Dominic Grieve: A lot—10 years.

Hilary Benn: Well, I bow to those who have greater experience, as the hon. Gentleman clearly does—10 years it is.
 My final point is about the other reason for the change and the way in which we propose to make it. The change would enable the United Kingdom to meet the obligations to comply with the measures, which have not yet been finalised, that are set out in the emerging European Union Council framework decision to harmonise drug trafficking penalties and to have maximum penalties of at least 10 years imprisonment for serious drug trafficking involving any controlled drug. That is the other reason why the Government have chosen to make the change in the way that we propose.

Simon Hughes: The Minister in his last sentence added a new factor, which also does not support the Government's case. Even if one accepts the proposition that there should be a harmonisation of drugs laws across Europe, which might not find immediate and instinctive approbation, the suggestion on the table is for the maximum to be 10 years for any controlled drug, which would be less than the Government propose for class C drugs and considerably less than the Government propose for other things. That appears to be inconsistent.
 My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome and I will oppose the clause and the schedule. We think that the provisions are nonsense and that the case was not made in the beginning, has been less clearly made as the months have passed and has absolutely not been made today. I hope that the provisions will not survive their passage through Parliament. 
 However, the Minister has undertaken—partly explicitly, partly implicitly—to ensure that there is as much information in the public domain as he can lay his hands on about any representations made in relation to the requirement for reclassification or upgrading of the maximum penalties for offences in relation to class C drugs other than cannabis. He must also provide as much information as he can about the point that the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) and others made about the current frequency of, and tariff for, the import of huge quantities of drugs, which I accept needs an appropriate penalty. The Minister should also give what I hope could be a considered rethink of some of the pragmatic suggestions that have been made in the Committee and in the House for different offences that could deal with the intermediate or major commercial activities of enabling people to have access to drugs. I hold absolutely no brief for people who import or traffic in huge numbers of harmful substances, including the less harmful ones. I want to ensure that the users and the petty dealers are not dealt with in the same way. 
 I hope that the Minister understands that we want clear messages and straightforward information, to ensure that the kids in schools, whether they are in Oxfordshire, London, Northamptonshire, Somerset or elsewhere, can be taught in a way that they understand, that the police's priorities are set and that we can guide the Home Secretary's intelligent initiative at the beginning of this Parliament to an intelligent conclusion. At the moment we are in danger of not doing so, despite the Home Affairs Committee's good advice. That would be a loss in relation to public policy, a loss in relation to enforcement and a loss in our potential to reduce the amount of drug use and abuse, addiction and the other bad things that flow from that.

Dominic Grieve: I have found it difficult to approach the clause and schedule 20 properly, because in one sense I am understanding of the problem that the Government face. I can see persuasive reasons why the reclassification of cannabis as a class C drug should not entail complete reclassification. In particular, the public need protection against drug
 trafficking and production. I know only too well from my work that people make huge profits from those activities, and a five-year sentence of imprisonment for a major drug trafficker who brings in tonnes of cannabis in no way sufficiently reflects the gravity of the offence or the profits that are made. I have endlessly prosecuted lorry drivers who brought vast cargoes of cannabis from the Netherlands, having picked them up from emporiums on the Dutch-German border. I do not want to be too anecdotal, but I know that there is a huge trafficking problem, and five years is manifestly insufficient as a maximum sentence.
 Faced with that difficulty, I find myself in a slight dilemma about the clause and the schedule. If I vote against them, I might be said to be sending the message that I am not concerned about that difficulty, but I am. On the other hand, I cannot avoid the fact that voting for them will raise the maximum sentence for a huge range of generic class C drugs. The Minister, who has been kind and pleasant with the Committee, has acknowledged that he has no evidential justification for that change. 
 We are caught between a rock and a hard place. Given that the Committee must make due and proper inquiries about each provision, clause by clause and schedule by schedule, my inclination is to vote against both provisions. Indeed, that is what I intend to do.

David Cameron: Just for the record, does my hon. Friend agree that the Government need to introduce a stiff penalty for dealing at the top end and clear police powers to confiscate at the bottom end, but are in fact doing neither?

Dominic Grieve: Certainly, the Government are doing neither. To put myself in their position for a moment, they might argue that a 14-year sentence does not mean that people will be sentenced to 14 years, but simply that there will be greater flexibility in the system. They might say that no one expects those who produce or import anabolic steroids suddenly to get 14 years and that such people will continue to be sentenced in the same way. Well, that is what the Government might say, and Parliament may issue a generic guideline that covers a huge range of drugs. However, the Committee has said nothing about Parliament's intentions as regards sentencing, and I would not be at all surprised if there was an upward creep in sentences, even though there had been no public call for such a change hitherto.
 We worry about lots of things in this Committee, and the prison population has been the subtext of many of our debates—it is a rather serious topic. We want to lock up those who need locking up, but we do not want to lock up for too long those who do not need locking up for long periods. In that respect, however, the drafting strikes me as very badly thought through. I know what the Government want to achieve, and I want to help them achieve it. Indeed, if they do not return to the issue on Report, we may do so, to help them achieve what they intend—a huge and flexible range of sentences that reflects the 
 reclassification of cannabis as a class C drug but continues to penalise drug traffickers. 
 What the Government seek to do in the present provisions, however, goes far beyond that. If the Minister explains in concrete terms why there is a vital need—some pressing public policy need—to include the other drugs on the list, I would be the first to say, ''That's fine. Let's go along with it.''

Simon Hughes: Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared, like me, to take part in discussions that might conclude that penalties for practitioners such as pharmacists and doctors who abuse their position might be worthy of specific consideration? The idea would be horses for courses. There is a range to be considered, including the big dealer, and we might be able to reach some agreement.

Dominic Grieve: Indeed. A variety of things could be done.
 In the end, the judiciary will keep a discretion. However, I am somewhat wedded to the civil liberties of this country and to the idea of not having oppressive laws. Parliament long ago decided that class C drugs merited a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment, because it did not consider the matter to be of any great consequence. The misuse of anabolic steroids, as we know, albeit to be deplored, is not a great social evil. It is a piece of folly by athletes or body builders who wish thus to damage their systems. Those offences do not merit 14 years' imprisonment. Perhaps circumstances will change. 
 I am making a plea to the Government. In voting against the clause, I want to make it clear that I understand their intentions, but that they have used bad drafting. They have tried to take a short cut to achieve a perfectly sensible end. It would be much more sensible to go back and sort out how they will tackle the cannabis problem. It may be necessary to introduce a new class of drug, such as B(a) or some such intermediate categorisation, rather than tinkering around with the poor old class C drugs that have existed hitherto, which, on the whole, have not caused people very great problems. On that basis—reluctantly, in some ways—I feel constrained to vote against the clause. 
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 248 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Question put, That schedule 20 be the Twentieth schedule to the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Schedule 20 agreed to. 
 Clause 249 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 250 - Sentencing: repeals

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No.751, in
clause 250, page 137, line 21, at end insert— 
 '( ) sections 35 and 40 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (fine defaulters),'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendments Nos. 778, 780, 786, 787, 752 to 754, 815, 826 and 838. 
 Government new clause 19—Power to impose unpaid work requirement or curfew requirement on fine defaulter. 
 Government new clause 20—Fine defaulters: driving disqualification. 
 Government new schedule 2—Default orders: modification of provisions relating to community orders.

Hilary Benn: New clauses 19 and 20 and new schedule 2 re-enact, with appropriate modifications for the new framework, the provisions for fine defaulters that are contained in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. Amendment No. 838 repeals the existing provisions in the 1997 Act. Amendments Nos. 751 to 754, 778, 780, 786, 787, 815 and 826 are consequential amendments that result from that re-enactment.

David Heath: We can make rapid progress through much of chapter 8. I do not wish to query the technical amendments, but I hope that the new clauses will not be the final word on what the Government feel they may be able to do to provide new ways to enforce fines. The hon. Member for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) made a sensible suggestion earlier in the proceedings. I do not think that he made it totally in the context of Essex, as his suggestion applies elsewhere in the country, and I hope that it will be considered.
 Has the Minister also considered whether there is scope to impound vehicles under Government new clause 20? I do not mean forfeiture of vehicles, because 
 that would get us into areas of disproportionality, which are some of the problems that Her Majesty's Customs and Excise experiences when it takes cars that it suspects of having been used to bring in goods that are slightly over the legal limit. We are in the curious position that a car can be impounded if it is parked on a double yellow line and is not moved within the requisite time, but if it is moved within the requisite time but has an unpaid penalty ticket that becomes an unpaid fine, it cannot be impounded. A possible effective deterrent to somebody who defaults on traffic fines would be to impound his car.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is making an important point. It seemed to me that his anxiety about the forfeiture under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 is not an analogy that one need worry about too much. The whole problem with that was that it was confiscation by administrative diktat. However, if somebody has a fine outstanding, I see no reason why the vehicle should not be seized and sold to cover that fine. Indeed, that might be an extremely effective way to ensure that payments are made.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support.

Hilary Benn: I was refreshing my memory from a previous discussion, but the proposal by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is such a good idea that, among the measures that the Government propose to pilot to improve fine enforcement, is that a clamped vehicle could be sold if the fine is not paid. Therefore I accept his argument entirely.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Minister. The problem with clamping, however, is that the vehicle is kept in what may be an inappropriate place. It should be taken to the car pound. That is just a technical point. The measure is helpful, and we shall see whether it has the desired effect.
 I wish to make a point about new schedule 2. Paragraph 5 gives the Secretary of State 
''Power to alter numbers of hours or days''.
 I am not querying the Secretary of State's power to do that by order. I am simply making an inquiry. There is provision to alter the number of hours or days specified, but not to alter the amount; in other words, to change the bands to coincide with current rates. I wonder whether that is helpful or whether the Minister might like the power to amend both sides of the table. Otherwise, the bands are fossilised at current monetary values, which seems to be an unnecessary restriction on the powers of the Secretary of State. I do not often argue for greater powers for the Secretary of State, but it seems curious that the new schedule is expressed in that way.

Hilary Benn: On that last point, I must confess that I am not entirely sure what arrangements are made elsewhere in legislation for dealing with the question that the hon. Gentleman sensibly raises about the changing real value of specified penalties. May I reflect on that and get back to him?
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 250, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 251 - Amendments relating to sentencing

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. I have some remarks to make about schedule 21, but clause 251 merely introduces the schedule. I seek your guidance on whether I may extend my remarks to the schedule rather than keeping to the clause?

Eric Illsley: Obviously, if the hon. Gentleman is unable to raise his points in the debates on the amendments, I will allow a debate on the schedule.

Humfrey Malins: Further to that point of order, Mr. Illsley. That is helpful. I do not want to find myself in the position of having some interesting contributions to make about the schedule but being told that, because we have passed clause 251, I should have made them earlier, just as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey got his best shots off on the wrong clause. I do not want to fall into a trap.

Eric Illsley: I cannot think for one minute that the hon. Gentleman will fall into any traps. I shall bear in mind what he says and consider the issue if and when we get to a debate on schedule 21.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 251 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 21 - Amendments relating to sentencing

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 758, in
schedule 21, page 251, line 12, at end insert— 
 'Piracy Act 1837 (c.88) 
 Section 3 of the Piracy Act 1837 (punishment for offence under certain repealed Acts relating to piracy) shall cease to have effect.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 808.

Hilary Benn: Before we start on this long list of Government amendments, I want to respond to the point of order raised at the beginning of this morning's deliberations. I flagged up in my missive to Committee members the fact that we would table several further consequential and drafting amendments. I apologise for not doing this earlier, but I shall be happy to circulate my speaking notes, which explain the purpose of those amendments, and as we go through each of them, I shall explain what they do. In essence and in summary, they change references to new orders and make the existing structures accommodate intermittent custody and the new sentencing framework. For the convenience of the Committee, we have tried to group the amendments by Act, although that sense of convenience might not be felt by all hon. Members when they apply their minds to the amendments.
 Amendments Nos. 758 and 808 repeal section 3 of the Piracy Act 1837, which provides a punishment of transportation under two other Acts, both of which have been repealed. It is thus redundant, and can now be repealed.

David Heath: I thank the Minister for his earlier comments about providing notes for us. It is helpful and we are grateful.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 759, in
schedule 21, page 251, line 12, at end insert— 
 'Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c.12) 
 (1) Section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (restrictions on reports of proceedings in which young persons are concerned) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (4A)(d), for ''section 62(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'' there is substituted ''section 202(c) or (d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (3) In subsection (11)— 
 (a) in the definition of ''sexual offence'', for ''has the same meaning as in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'' there is substituted ''means an offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 11 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', and 
 (b) in the definition of ''violent offence'', for ''has the same meaning as in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'' there is substituted ''means an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 11 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 Section 62(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is being repealed and re-enacted in the Bill as clause 202(c) and (d). The reference in it to section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 therefore needs to change accordingly. Also, the definitions of sexual offence and violent offence are currently in the 2000 Act. The reference should refer instead to schedule 11, where all the offences to count as violent and sexual are listed. That is what the amendment achieves.

David Heath: Obviously, there will be a cross-reference to the Sexual Offences Bill. How can that be managed in respect of two Bills that will probably receive Royal Assent at the same time?

Hilary Benn: The hon. Gentleman is right. The two will have to dovetail. I am sure that a mechanism will be found to achieve that. I said when we debated the relevant clauses earlier that the ones that are listed reflect the offences as they currently stand. They will need to be changed in due course to reflect the offences that Parliament finally decides on when assent is given to the Sexual Offences Bill.

Dominic Grieve: I am sure that that is right. It will be a delicious nightmare because the Act that we shall pass—this Act—will be unintelligible in places because it will have been amended by the enactment of the Sexual Offences Bill. That is the simple consequence of enacting so much legislation all in one go.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 760, in
schedule 21, page 251, line 16, at end insert— 
 'Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (c.37) 
 In section 16 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (offences committed by children), in subsection (3), after ''sentences)'' there is inserted ''or Chapter 5 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (dangerous offenders)''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 809.

Hilary Benn: The amendment adds the new sentences for dangerous offenders to the exception to the rule that offences committed when an offender is under 14 should not be counted as evidence of previous convictions; and amendment No. 809 repeals a reference to mandatory sentences, because the section to which it refers no longer contains a mandatory sentence.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 761, in
schedule 21, page 251, line 26, leave out from 'interpretation)' to end of line 27 and insert '— 
 (a) in subsection (1), the definition of ''suspended sentence'' is omitted, and 
 (b) subsection (2) is omitted.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 810.

Hilary Benn: The purpose of the amendments is to insert a repeal of subsection (2) of section 104 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 into schedule 21, and amendment No. 810 also repeals a definition of suspended sentence that is no longer needed.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 762, in
schedule 21, page 251, line 32, leave out '(2)(b)' and insert '(2)— 
 (a) in paragraph (b)'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 763, 764 and 811.

Hilary Benn: Amendments Nos. 762, 763 and part of 811 repeal a section of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which allowed offenders to appeal to the court against being recalled to prison after their release. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 made recall a matter for the Parole Board rather than for the court. The section would have been repealed as a consequence of that Act, but it was needed for a few cases in which offenders had been sentenced before the Act came into force. It is no longer needed.
 Amendment No. 811 also repeals the right of an offender who has been committed to prison under section 116 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 to appeal against a committal. Section 116 provides for committing a person to prison if they have committed an offence while on licence. The provision for recalling a person if that happens is now in clauses 232 and 233, so section 116 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is being repealed. Those clauses also contain appeal provisions, so the right to appeal in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 can also be repealed. And that is quite a sentence. 
 Amendment No. 764 changes a reference to section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which describes how remand time is credited to a prisoner's sentence, to clause 220 of the Bill, which deals with that issue. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No.763, in 
schedule 21, page 251, line 36, at end insert 
 'and 
 (b) paragraph (c) and the word ''or'' immediately preceding it are omitted.'
 No. 764, in 
schedule 21, page 252, line 6, at end insert— 
 'In Schedule 2 (procedural and other provisions applicable on order for retrial), in paragraph 2(4), for the words from the beginning to ''apply'' there is substituted ''Section 220 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (crediting of periods of remand in custody: terms of imprisonment and detention) shall apply''.'—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 765, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 15, at end insert— 
 '( ) After subsection (2A) there is inserted— 
 ''(2B) A person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment to which an intermittent custody order under section 165 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relates shall not during any licence period specified for the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(i) of that section have a firearm or ammunition in his possession.''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 766 to 769.

Hilary Benn: Amendment Nos. 765 and 768 are provisions to ban firearms to fit intermittent custody; amendments Nos. 766, 767, 769 amend the same provision to take account of the new community order.

David Heath: Perhaps the Minister can clarify something for me. Amendment No. 765 states that offenders serving intermittent custody will not be permitted to have a firearm or ammunition in their possession for all intermittent licence periods plus five years after their release. Can they maintain a firearms certificate?

Hilary Benn: Good question. I do not know; I shall have to inquire. It may be of help to the Committee if I explain that offenders serving normal custody are banned from having firearms for five years from the time of their release. The amendment will ban offenders on intermittent custody for all intermittent licence periods plus five years after release from their final period of custody. That seems the most sensible way of accommodating intermittent custody with the banning provisions.

Humfrey Malins: Is the amendment consistent with section 36B of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980? The Minister does not have to answer now.

Hilary Benn: I am relieved to hear it. I will gladly write to the hon. Gentleman.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 766, in 
schedule 21, page 252, line 17, leave out 
 'within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003'.
 No. 767, in 
schedule 21, page 252, line 17, at end insert— 
 '( ) After subsection (3) there is inserted— 
 ''(3ZA) In subsection (3)(b) above, ''community order'' means— 
 (a) a community order within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 made in England and Wales, or 
 (b) a probation order made in Scotland.'' '
 No. 768, in 
schedule 21, page 252, line 17, at end insert— 
 '( ) In subsection (6), after ''(2)'' there is inserted '', (2B)''.'
 No. 769, in 
schedule 21, page 252, leave out lines 18 to 21 and insert— 
 '(1) Section 52 (forfeiture and disposal of firearms; cancellation of certificate by convicting court) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1)(c), for ''probation order'' there is substituted ''community order''. 
 (3) After subsection (1) there is inserted— 
 ''(1A) In subsection (1)(c) ''community order'' means— 
 (a) a community order within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 made in England and Wales, or 
 (b) a probation order made in Scotland.'' ' 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 770, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 26, after 'of' insert 'Part 12 of'.
 The amendment clarifies that a reference to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in section 94 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 should be a reference to part 12 of that Act.

David Heath: The Minister has said what it does, and I could read that for myself. He has not said why part 12 is specified for the purpose of this enactment and not others.

Hilary Benn: The straight answer is that there is a good reason for it. I am wholly confident that I will be able to justify it subsequently. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 771, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 26, at end insert— 
 'Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (c.54) 
 In section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (remands and committals to local authority accommodation), for the definition of ''sexual offence'' and ''violent offence'' in subsection (12) there is substituted— 
 '' ''sexual offence'' means an offence specified in Part 2 of Schedule 11 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003; 
 ''violent offence'' means murder or an offence specified in Part 1 of Schedule 11 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;''.'
 Currently, the definitions of ''sexual offence'' and ''violent offence'' are to be found in section 161 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Instead of defining the terms, the Bill lists those offences that count as sexual and violent, which we debated at some length in parts 1 and 2 of schedule 11. The amendment updates a reference to the meaning of these terms, which had pointed to the 2000 Act, in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.

Dominic Grieve: At the risk of repeating the point, this will be completely redundant once the Sexual Offences Bill is on the statute book. The schedule refers to the existing list of offences, which will presumably cease to have effect once the Sexual Offences Bill is enacted.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 772, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 29, leave out 
 'section 87 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000' 
 and insert 
 'section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967'.
 In paragraph 12, the reference to section 87 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 should be to section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The amendment achieves this. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 773, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 31, at end insert— 
 'Thames Barrier and Flood Prevention Act 1972 (c.xiv) 
 In section 56 of the Thames Barrier and Flood Prevention Act 1972 (orders for carrying out certain defence works), in subsection 3(a)(ii), for ''six months'' there is substituted ''12 months''.'
 The amendment raises the maximum penalty for an indictable offence created under the enabling power contained in the Thames Barrier and Flood Protection Act 1972. It is necessary because the maximum custodial penalty of six months attracted by an offence created under this provision will not be compatible with the new sentencing framework. The maximum penalty for such an offence is therefore being raised to 12 months. Given the indictable nature of those offences it is considered appropriate to raise the maximum penalties for offences created by this enabling power to 12 months, as opposed to 51 weeks.

Dominic Grieve: We have this strange situation where custodial penalties are being removed for some offences and enhanced for others. I know that that was debated on Tuesday, but what are the criteria for raising rather than diminishing them? Do particular matters relating to breaches of the Thames Barrier and Flood Prevention Act 1972 make it necessary?

Hilary Benn: As I said, given the indictable nature of the offence, it is considered appropriate to do so.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 774, in
schedule 21, page 252, line 39, leave out 'or'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 775.

Hilary Benn: The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 sets out how long an offender has to wait until his conviction is spent and he no longer has to disclose it. The time varies according to the severity of the sentence. Some convictions are never spent. Amendments Nos. 774 and 775 ensure that convictions are never spent for which the extended sentence for certain violent and sexual offences is imposed. That includes under-18s as well as adults.

Dominic Grieve: The description just passing its way gently past us raised some concerns. It is difficult from the brief nature of the amendment to ascertain what they are. The question of the rehabilitation of offenders and periods during which convictions may or may not be spent is difficult. Indeed, at some point we will be legislating on the subject. There may be good reasons why sexual offences should never be spent, but will it lead to change in relation to juveniles, which is what I understood the Minister to be saying? If so, it would be helpful to have some amplification about what is happening, although perhaps I have misunderstood.

Humfrey Malins: We must have a little concern if, as the Minister said, a juvenile could find himself in custody
 for a long period and be released in his 20s, but then find that there was no opportunity for that conviction to be spent during the whole of his lifetime. If that is right, a youngster might come out after a long sentence at the age of, say, 28 or 30 with another 50 years of life without any opportunity for that conviction to be spent. That is a worrying thought.

Hilary Benn: I hear the points that have been made. Under the current provisions some convictions are never spent. The amendments would ensure that extended sentences for the violent and sexual offences listed in schedule 11 would also not be regarded as being spent. If the aim is public protection, the argument is that the provisions should apply to the offender regardless of the age at which they committed the offence, which is why it is proposed that under-18-year-olds are included as well as adults.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 775, in 
schedule 21, page 252, line 41, at end insert 
 'or an extended sentence under section 207 or 208 of that Act'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 891, in
schedule 21, page 253, line 2, at end insert— 
 'Armed Forces Act 1976 (c.52) 
 (1) Section 8 of the Armed Forces Act 1976 (powers of Standing Civilian Courts in relation to civilians) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (1)(a), for ''six months'' there is substituted ''twelve months''. 
 (3) In subsection (2), for ''12 months'' there is substituted ''65 weeks''. 
 (4) At the end there is inserted— 
 ''(5) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument— 
 (a) amend subsection (1)(a) by substituting for the reference to 12 months a reference to 18 months, and 
 (b) amend subsection (2) by substituting for the reference to 65 weeks a reference to 24 months. 
 (6) Section 265(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (power to make supplementary provision etc.)applies in relation to an order under subsection (5) as it applies in relation to an order under section 139 of that Act (power to increase limits on sentencing powers of magistrates' courts). 
 (7) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (5) may only be made if a draft of the statutory instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.'' '.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 892.

Hilary Benn: The amendments are consequential on the changes to magistrates courts' sentencing powers made earlier under clauses 137 to 139. They will enable standing civilian courts to sentence to 12 months custody in respect of one offence and 65 weeks in respect of two or more offences to be served consecutively, and enable those powers to be adjusted by order in line with any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates courts under clause 139. Standing civilian courts are set up outside the United Kingdom to deal with civilians, especially the dependants of service personnel, who are subject to
 service law. Their powers of sentence are similar to those of magistrates courts.

Lady Hermon: I draw the Minister's attention to the fact that in relation to increased sentencing for drugs-related offences the Bill quite correctly says that schedule 20 does not affect the penalty for any offence committed before the commencement of that schedule. That is to maintain compatibility with article 7 of the European convention on human rights. I am concerned that the amendments that are being made to schedule 21 do not bear a similar caveat to ensure compatibility with article 7.

David Heath: I am pleased that the Minister is addressing the issues of courts-martial and attendant matters, because that was a concern. I remind him of the argument, which I shall not repeat, about 12 months versus 51 weeks. I suspect that that argument applies to the present instance as well.

Hilary Benn: In answer to the hon. Lady's point, the matter will be covered in a commencement order. If I can give her any further information in answer to the point that she raised, I will write to her.
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 776, in
schedule 21, page 253, leave out lines 6 to 8.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 777.

Hilary Benn: Two amendments to the Bail Act 1976 were placed in the wrong order, such that an amendment to section 1 appeared after an amendment to section 2. The amendments correct that error.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 777, in 
schedule 21, page 253, line 11, at end insert— 
 '( ) In subsection (2), in the definition of ''probation hostel'', for the words from ''by'' onwards there is substituted ''by a community order under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 No. 778, in 
schedule 21, page 253, line 26, leave out from beginning to '(non' and insert— 
 'The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 is amended as follows. 
 In section 11'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 779, in
schedule 21, page 253, line 29, at end insert— 
 'In section 33 (maximum penalties on summary conviction in pursuance of section 22), in subsection (1)(a), for ''3 months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 781.

Hilary Benn: Amendment No. 779 increases the maximum penalty for specified summary offences from three months to 51 weeks. The change is necessary because, under the new sentencing framework, the sentence of custody plus, whose maximum term in relation to one offence will be 51 weeks, will replace all custodial sentences of less than 12 months. Therefore, following implementation of the new sentencing framework, the minimum
 maximum custodial sentence will be 51 weeks—[Hon. Members: ''Is that the same as the maximum minimum?''] It all makes sense—

Simon Hughes: if one knows how to interpret it.

Hilary Benn: It all depends on how you tell them.
 A custodial sentence of three months will no longer exist. In order to preserve a custodial sentence for these offences, it is necessary to raise the maximum penalty to 51 weeks' imprisonment. 
 The offences to which the provision relates are: criminal damage to a value of less than £5,000; aiding and abetting in relation to such criminal damage; and aggravated vehicle taking where the damage caused is valued at less than £5,000. All those offences are of significant magnitude to justify retaining the option of a custodial penalty. 
 Amendment No. 781 updates a reference to section 84 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which is being re-enacted in the Bill. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 780, in 
schedule 21, page 253, line 29, at end insert— 
 'In section 85 (power to remit fine), in subsection (2A), for ''section 35(2)(a) or (b) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997'' there is substituted ''section (Power to impose unpaid work requirement or curfew requirement on fine defaulter)(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.
 No. 781, in 
schedule 21, page 253, line 29, at end insert— 
 'In section 133 (consecutive terms of imprisonment), in subsection (1), for ''Subject to section 84 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000,'' there is substituted ''Subject to section (Restriction on consecutive sentences for released prisoners) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003,''.'—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 782, in
schedule 21, page 254, line 7, at end insert— 
 'The Criminal Justice Act 1982 is amended as follows. 
 In section 32 (early release of prisoners), in subsection (1)(a), after ''life'' there is inserted '', imprisonment for public protection under section 205 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or an extended sentence under section 207 of that Act'' '.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 783 and 784.

Hilary Benn: The amendments concern the Criminal Justice Act 1982. Section 32 of that Act provides for the executive release of prisoners. It enables the Secretary of State to order that certain prisoners can be released early, but not earlier than the specified period. Certain categories of prisoner are excluded from this provision, such as those serving imprisonment for life and those who have committed an excluded offence. Amendment No. 782 adds two more exclusions: prisoners on the sentence of imprisonment for public protection under clause 205 and the new extended sentence for certain violent and sexual offences under clause 207.
 Amendments Nos. 783 and 784 concern schedule 13 of the 1982 Act, which sets out reciprocal arrangements for community service orders. The two 
 amendments ensure that community service orders made in Northern Ireland can still transfer to England and Wales. Such orders will be treated as if they were community orders made in England and Wales under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Also, certain references to community service orders in that schedule are changed to community service orders or, as the case may be, community orders within the meaning of part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The reference to community service orders is still necessary because the provision also covers offenders who live in Scotland, where community service orders still exist. No substantive changes are made to the provision. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 783, in 
schedule 21, page 254, leave out lines 8 to 10 and insert— 
 '(1) Part 3 of Schedule 13 (reciprocal arrangements (Northern Ireland) persons residing in England and Wales or Scotland) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In paragraph 7—'.
 No. 784, in 
schedule 21, page 254, line 17, at end insert— 
 '(3) For paragraph 9(3) there is substituted— 
 ''(3) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph— 
 (a) a community service order made or amended in the circumstances specified in paragraph 7 above shall be treated as if it were a community order made in England and Wales under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the provisions of Part 12 of that Act (so far as relating to such orders) shall apply accordingly; and 
 (b) a community service order made or amended in the circumstances specified in paragraph 8 above shall be treated as if it were a community service order made in Scotland and the legislation relating to community service orders in Scotland shall apply accordingly.'' 
 (4) In paragraph 9(4)(a), after ''community service orders'' there is inserted ''or, as the case may be, community orders (within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)''. 
 (5) In paragraph 9(5), after ''a community service order'' there is inserted ''or, as the case may be, a community order (within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)''. 
 (6) In paragraph 9(6)— 
 (a) after ''community service orders'', where first occurring, there is inserted ''or, as the case may be, community orders (within the meaning of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)'', and 
 (b) in paragraph (b)(i), for ''the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'' there is substituted ''Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.' 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 785, in
schedule 21, page 254, line 24, at end insert— 
 '(aa) in subsection (1A), after ''2000'' there is inserted ''or under any of sections 205 to 208 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', and for ''that subsection'' there is substituted ''that section'' '.
 Section 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983 allows the court to make a hospital order in place of an offender's sentence, based on the assessment of two medical practitioners. The amendment makes it clear that there is no exception for the new sentences for dangerous offenders. That is covered by clauses 205 to 208. Public protection is best served by ensuring that everyone who requires treatment, either for his or her own safety or for the protection of others, can receive it.

Dominic Grieve: I may have misunderstood the amendment. Is it the intention that such orders can still to be made? I assume that that is the answer. I see the Minister nodding, so I shall sit down.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 786, in 
schedule 21, page 255, line 7, at end insert— 
 'Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52){**qc**} 
 'In section 164 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (power of constables to require production of driving licence and in certain cases statement of date of birth), in subsection (5), for ''section 40 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997'' there is substituted ''section (Fine defaulters: driving disqualification) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 No. 787, in 
schedule 21, page 255, line 8, leave out from the beginning to '(combination' and insert— 
 'The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is amended as follows. 
 In section 27 (production of licence), in subsection (3), for ''section 40 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997'' there is substituted ''section (Fine defaulters: driving disqualification) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 In section 46'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 788, in
schedule 21, page 255, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert— 
 'The Football Spectators Act 1989 is amended as follows. 
 In section 7 (disqualification for membership of scheme), subsection (9) is omitted. 
 In section 14E (banning orders: general), after subsection (6) there is inserted— 
 ''(7) A person serving a sentence of imprisonment to which an intermittent custody order under section 165 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relates is to be treated for the purposes of this section as having been detained in legal custody until his final release; and accordingly any reference in this section to release is, in relation to a person serving such a sentence, a reference to his final release.'' 
 In section 18 (information), after subsection (4) there is inserted— 
 ''(5) In relation to a person serving a sentence of imprisonment to which an intermittent custody order under section 165 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relates, any reference in this section to his detention or to his release shall be construed in accordance with section 14E(7).''.'
 The amendment amends the provision for football banning orders so that they apply to intermittent custody. A person who has received a football banning order must report to a police station within five days of the order being imposed to receive instructions on the content of the order. If the person is in custody when the banning order is passed, he has five days from the day of release from prison to report to a police station. 
 In the case of intermittent custody, we must make it clear to which release from custody that applies. If a person is released for only very short periods, it may be unfair to require him to report to a police station in that time, especially as the release periods of intermittent custody are intended for the offender to work, attend education, undertake child care responsibilities, and so on. However, if the offender were subject to a ban, it would not be right if the ban began only when he finished all the custodial periods. 
 The amendment will mean that the offender must report to a police station within five days of his final release from custody, but the court should impose a 
 prohibited activity requirement, which prohibits the offender from attending football matches, to cover the intermittent licence periods. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 789, in
schedule 21, page 255, leave out lines 18 to 23 and insert— 
 '33(1) Section 68 (persons disqualified from being private foster parents) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2)(d), the words ''a probation order has been made in respect of him or he has been'' are omitted. 
 (3) After subsection (2) there is inserted— 
 ''(2A) A conviction in respect of which a probation order was made before 1st October 1992 (which would not otherwise be treated as a conviction) is to be treated as a conviction for the purposes of subsection (2)(d).'' 
 34(1) In Schedule 9A (child minding and day care for young children), paragraph 4 is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subparagraph (2)(g), the words ''placed on probation or'' are omitted. 
 (3) At the end there is inserted— 
 ''(7) A conviction in respect of which a probation order was made before 1st October 1992 (which would not otherwise be treated as a conviction) is to be treated as a conviction for the purposes of this paragraph.'' '

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 812.

Hilary Benn: The amendments correct two amendments to the Children Act 1989 to make them clearer. Both concern eligibility to care for young children. The original consequential amendment replaced a reference to probation orders with the new community order and repealed a reference to ''being placed on probation'', as there is no longer such a disposal.
 The reference to probation orders in section 68(2)(d) of the 1989 Act should make it clearer that to be given a probation order before 1 October 1992, which would not otherwise count as a conviction, will count as such in reference to disqualification from being a foster parent. The date is relevant because there is no question that probation orders made on or after that date are to count as convictions. 
 Similarly, the reference to ''being placed on probation'' in paragraph 9 to schedule 9A should clarify that persons given a probation order before 1 October 1992, which would not otherwise count as a conviction, will count as such in reference to disqualification from being a child minder or from providing day care for young children. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 790, in
schedule 21, page 255, leave out lines 25 and 26 and insert— 
 'The Criminal Justice Act 1991 is amended as follows. 
 Section 65 (supervision of young offenders after release) is omitted.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 791 and 813.

Hilary Benn: The amendments adapt schedule 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 so that probation orders made in Northern Ireland can still be transferred to England and Wales. The names of the various terms and their location in legislation need to change, so that
 the new community order and its arrangements, rather than community rehabilitation orders and their arrangements, are referred to.
 The repeal table in schedule 26 contains an error in relation to section 9(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Paragraph (c), not paragraph (d), should be repealed, and the amendment corrects that error. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 791, in 
schedule 21, page 255, line 26, at end insert— 
 '(1) Schedule 3 (reciprocal enforcement of certain orders) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In paragraph 10(3)(d), for the words from ''paragraph 3 of Schedule 2'' onwards there is substituted ''section 181 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (3) In paragraph 11(2)— 
 (a) in paragraph (a)— 
 (i) for ''probation order'' there is substituted ''community order'', and 
 (ii) after ''England and Wales'' there is inserted ''under section j001 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', and for paragraph (b) there is substituted— 
 ''(b) the provisions of Part 12 of that Act (so far as relating to such orders) shall apply accordingly.'' 
 (4) In paragraph 11(3), for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted— 
 ''(a) the requirements of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to community orders (within the meaning of that Part); 
 (b) the powers of the home court under Schedule 7 to that Act, as modified by this paragraph; and''. 
 (5) In paragraph 11(4), for the words from ''probation order made by a court'' onwards there is substituted ''community order made by a court in England and Wales under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, except a power conferred by paragraph 9(1)(b) or (c) or 13(2) of Schedule 7 to that Act''. 
 (6) In paragraph 11(5), for ''the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'' there is substituted ''Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'. 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 792, in
schedule 21, page 256, line 16, at end insert— 
 '(1) Section 234 (probation orders: persons residing in England and Wales) is amended as follows. 
 (2) For subsection (2) there is substituted— 
 ''(2) Subsection (1) above applies to any probation order made under section 228 unless the order includes requirements which are more onerous than those which a court in England and Wales could impose on an offender under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.''. 
 (3) In subsection (4)— 
 (a) in paragraph (a)— 
 (i) for ''paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 2 to the 2000 Act'' there is substituted ''section 187(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', 
 (ii) for ''or, as the case may be, community rehabilitation orders'' there is substituted ''or, as the case may be, community orders under Part 12 of that Act'', and 
 (iii) for ''paragraph 5 of the said Schedule 2'' there is substituted ''section 187 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', and 
 (b) in paragraph (b), for ''subparagraphs (5) to (7) of the said paragraph 5'' there is substituted ''sections 187(4) and 188(1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (4) In subsection (5), for ''Schedule 3'' onwards there is substituted ''Schedule 7 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 shall apply as if it were a community order made under section 160 of that Act''. 
 (5) In subsection (6)— 
 (a) for ''Schedule 3 to the 2000 Act'' there is substituted ''Schedule 7 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003'', 
 (b) for ''subparagraphs (4) and (5) of paragraph 4'' there is substituted ''subparagraphs (6) and (7) of paragraph 9'', and 
 (c) for ''subparagraph (4)'' there is substituted ''subparagraph (6)''. 
 (6) In subsection (10)— 
 (a) for the words from ''paragraph 6'' to ''community rehabilitation orders'' there is substituted ''paragraph 8 of Schedule (Transfer of community orders to Scotland or Northern Ireland) (which relates to community orders'', and 
 (b) for ''an order made under section 41'' there is substituted ''a community order made under Part 12''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 814.

Hilary Benn: Amendment No. 792 does the same as the amendment that we have just considered. In this instance, the intention is that probation orders made in Scotland can still be transferred to England and Wales under the new sentencing framework.
 Amendment No. 814 repeals words in section 234(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 which amendment No. 792 replaces. There is no substantive change, and the provision's effect is maintained. 
 The amendment also repeals section 234(5)(b), which provided for certain community orders made in Scotland to transfer to England and Wales as community punishment and rehabilitation orders. The latter will no longer exist, and the amendment to section 234(5)(a) ensures that Scottish community orders can transfer to England and Wales as community orders under clause 160. As a result, section 234(5)(b) can be repealed. 
 The amendment also repeals section 234(11), which defines ''the 2000 Act''. The definition is no longer needed, as a result of changes made by amendment No. 792. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 793, in
schedule 21, page 257, line 14, leave out from '2003' to the end of line 15.
 A reference to ''probation order'' in section 562 of the Education Act 1996 was amended in the original consequential amendment—paragraph 42 of schedule 21 of the Bill—to the new community order or a youth community order. The reference to a youth community order is unnecessary because that section deals with children who are educated as boarders at a school. Youth community orders do not contain a residence requirement, so a child could not find himself or herself being educated as a boarder at a school by virtue of such an order. The amendment therefore omits the reference to youth community orders. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 794, in
schedule 21, page 257, line 15, at end insert— 
 'Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c.43){**qc**} 
 The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 is amended as follows. 
 In section 31 (duration and conditions of licences), in subsection (6), for ''section 46(3) of the 1991 Act'' there is substituted ''section 236(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 The amendment simply updates a reference that will no longer be accurate following the passage of the Bill. Section 46(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which indicates when prisoners are liable for removal from the United Kingdom, is being re-enacted, and changed into clause 236(2). The reference to it in section 31 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 must therefore be amended accordingly. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 795, in
schedule 21, page 257, line 28, leave out from beginning to '(4)(g)' and insert— 
 '(1) Section 38 (local provision of youth justice services) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 796.

Hilary Benn: The purpose of the amendments is to ensure that youth offending teams have the power to supervise under–18s who, under the new regime in the Bill, are released on licence from a sentence of detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which covers certain serious offences, or clause 208, which covers extended sentences for certain violent or sexual offences, where the offender is deemed to be dangerous.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 796, in 
schedule 21, page 257, line 31, at end insert— 
 '(3) In subsection (4)(i), after ''1997 Act'')'' there is inserted ''or by virtue of conditions imposed under section 229 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 797, in
schedule 21, page 257, line 33, at end insert— 
 '(1) Section 6 (committal for sentence in certain cases where offender committed in respect of another offence) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (3)(b), for ''section 120(1) below'' there is substituted ''paragraph 10(1) of Schedule 9 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 (3) For subsection (4)(e), there is substituted— 
 ''(e) paragraph 10(2) of Schedule 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (committal to Crown Court where offender convicted during operational period of suspended sentence).''. 
 In section 7 (power of Crown Court on committal for sentence under section 6), in subsection (2), for ''section 119 below'' there is substituted ''paragraphs 7 and 8 of Schedule 9 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 798 to 805.

Hilary Benn: Amendment No. 797 has two parts. The amendment to section 6 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 simply updates a
 reference to section 120(1), which is being consolidated into the Bill and changed.
 The amendment to section 7 concerns committal for sentence. The powers of the Crown court when a person is committed to it by the magistrates court with respect to a suspended sentence are different from the powers that it would have if the person had not had a suspended sentence. The relevant powers are specified in the provisions for dealing with suspended sentences. The reference to section 119 of the 2000 Act, which sets out those powers, must be changed to paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 9 of the Bill, which is where those powers will now be set out. 
 Amendment No. 798 concerns section 12 of the 2000 Act, the provision by which offenders can be given absolute and conditional discharges by the court. Various categories of offenders are excluded, including those affected by the ''two strikes'' provision, under which an offender committing two serious offences must receive a life sentence. That provision is being repealed and replaced by the new sentences for dangerous offenders in clauses 205 to 208—the sentence for public protection and the extended sentence. Thus the reference needs to be changed. 
 Amendment No. 799 concerns the setting of life sentence tariffs. When setting the tariff for a prisoner sentenced to life, the court should compare the release provisions for life sentences to those applying to non-life sentences. The Bill changes the calculation of the time that prisoners must serve before they are released. The reference to sections 33(2) and 35(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 therefore needs to be updated to show the release provisions in clause 224(1). 
 Amendment No. 800 repeals sections 116 and 117 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Those sections allow the court to return an offender to prison if he commits a new offence while on licence. Such provisions are replaced by the provisions in clauses 232 and 233 for recalling offenders administratively to prison. It is essential that if offenders violate the conditions of their licences or commit a new offence they should be returned to prison as swiftly as possible. Recalling them administratively rather than via the courts or the Parole Board will achieve that. All recall decisions will of course be examined by the Parole Board, to ensure that they have been taken fairly. Offenders will be able to make representations if they wish. 
 Amendment No. 801 concerns compensation orders. An offender can be required to compensate for personal injury, loss or damage resulting from an offence, or to make payments for funeral expenses in respect of a death resulting from an offence. The effect of the amendment is that the offender can be given a compensation order only in addition to, and not instead of, one of the new sentences for dangerous offenders. Amendment No. 802 has the same function in relation to the court's ability to impose a disqualification from driving. 
 Amendment No. 803 replaces a reference to section 84 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 with a reference to the clause that re-enacts it 
 exactly. Amendment No. 804 omits an unnecessary provision amending a reference to pre-sentence reports. The definition of pre-sentence reports is no longer needed in the 2000 Act, because pre-sentence reports are now dealt with in the Bill. 
 Amendment No. 805 corrects a drafting error. A reference is made to 
''section 230(c) or (d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''. 
 It should be section 202(c) or (d).

David Heath: Amendment No. 798 would insert a new sub-paragraph (a) into paragraph 48 and retain the rest as sub-paragraph (b). I have not had a chance to cross-reference the provision to the 2000 Act, and I simply want to ask the Minister a question. At first sight it appears odd to omit a duty to explain the effect of making an order for conditional discharge, unless the provision relates to a specific instance of conditional discharge that is no longer applicable. I wonder whether a general duty has been dispensed with.

Hilary Benn: I shall write to the hon. Gentleman with an answer to his question.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 798, in 
schedule 21, page 257, line 34, after ''discharge)'' insert 
 '— 
 (a) in subsection (1) for ''109(2), 110(2) or 111(2) below'' there is substituted ''section 110(2) or 111(2) below or section 205, 206, 207 or 208 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003)'', and 
 (b) '.
 No. 799, in 
schedule 21, page 259, line 37, at end insert— 
 'In section 82A (determination of tariffs), in subsection (3)(c), for ''sections 33(2) and 35(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991'' there is substituted ''section 224(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 No. 800, in 
schedule 21, page 260, line 13, at end insert— 
 'Sections 116 and 117 (return to prison etc. where offence committed during original sentence) shall cease to have effect.'
 No. 801, in 
schedule 21, page 260, line 13, at end insert— 
 'In section 130 (compensation orders against convicted persons), in subsection (2), for ''109(2), 110(2) or 111(2) above,'' there is substituted ''110(2) or 111(2) above or section 205, 206, 207 or 208 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003,''.'.
 No. 802, in 
schedule 21, page 260, line 28, at end insert— 
 'In section 146 (driving disqualification for any offence), in subsection (2), for ''109(2), 110(2) or 111(2) above'' there is substituted ''110(2) or 111(2) above or section 205, 206, 207 or 208 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 No. 803, in 
schedule 21, page 260, line 28, at end insert— 
 'In section 154 (commencement of Crown Court sentence), in subsection (2), for ''section 84 above'' there is substituted ''section (Restriction on consecutive sentences for released prisoners) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003''.'
 No. 804, in 
schedule 21, page 260, line 36, leave out subparagraph (5).
 No. 805, in 
schedule 21, page 263, line 23, leave out 'section 230(c) or (d)' and insert 'section 202(c) or (d)'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 806, in
schedule 21, page 264, line 6, at end insert— 
 'Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (c.19){**qc**} 
 (1) Section 62 of the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (loss of benefit for breach of community order) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (8), for the definition of ''relevant community order'' there is substituted— 
 '' ''relevant community order'' means—a community order made under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; or 
 any order falling in England or Wales to be treated as such an order.'' 
 (3) In subsection (11)(c)(ii), for ''to (e)'' there is substituted ''and (b)''.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 833.

Hilary Benn: Amendment No. 806 simply amends the definition of ''relevant community orders'' to match the new community orders. Amendment No. 833 repeals a reference to
''any time before the coming into force of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000'',
 which is now unnecessary. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 807, in
schedule 21, page 264, line 8, leave out from beginning to 'for' in line 9 and insert— 
 'The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 is amended as follows. 
 In section 69 (duties of local probation boards in connection with victims of certain offences), in subsection (8), for paragraph (a) there is substituted— 
 ''(a) murder or an offence specified in Schedule 11 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.'' 
 In section 70 (general interpretation), in subsection (5),'.
 The amendment changes the definition of ''sexual and violent offences'' to refer to the list in schedule 11 rather than to the definition given in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which is being repealed. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 892, in 
schedule 21, page 264, line 22, at end insert— 
 'Armed Forces Act 2001 (c.19){**qc**} 
 In section 30 of the Armed Forces Act 2001 (conditional release from custody), in subsection (6)(a) for ''six months'' there is substituted ''the term specified in subsection (1)(a) of section 8 of the Armed Forces Act 1976 (powers of courts in relation to civilians)''.'
 No. 875, in 
schedule 21, page 264, line 31, leave out paragraphs 78 to 81 and insert— 
 'In section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 (c.83) (idle and disorderly persons), for the words from ''subject to'' to the end there is substituted ''it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace to impose on such person (being thereof convicted before him by his own view, or by the confession of such person, or by the evidence on oath of one or more credible witnesses) a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale''. 
 ( ) Section 4 of that Act (rogues and vagabonds) is amended as follows. 
 ( ) In that section, for the words from ''shall be'' to the end there is substituted ''commits an offence under this section''. 
 ( ) At the end of that section (which becomes subsection (1)) there is inserted— 
 ''(2) It shall be lawful for any justice of the peace to impose on any person who commits an offence under this section (being thereof convicted before him by the confession of such person, or by the evidence on oath of one or more credible witnesses)— 
 (a) in the case of a person convicted of the offence of wandering abroad and lodging in any barn or outhouse, or in any deserted or unoccupied building, or in the open air, or under a tent, or in any cart or waggon, and not giving a good account of himself, a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale, and 
 (b) in the case of a person convicted of any other offence under this section, a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.''.'. 
 —[Hilary Benn.]
 Question proposed, That this schedule, as amended, be the Twenty-First schedule to the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: I am surprised, Mr. Illsley, that you have not exercised your inherent power to charge members of the public for watching our proceedings, which, for the past 30 minutes, have assumed the proportions of a Whitehall farce. Indeed, when the Bill gets to the other end of the Palace, Brian Rix himself might take part. I do not suppose that even one member of the Committee has the slightest idea of what has been said or done in the past 25 minutes, except for the Minister—perhaps not even him—and if anyone does, I challenge them to intervene now and give me a summary.
 Unless I am mistaken, the Government have introduced 60 or more amendments to schedule 21, which is a sorry state of affairs. It reflects the fact that the Government rush too fast, never let anything bed in, lurch from headline to headline, from one flagship policy to another and from gimmick to gimmick. I realise the truth of the proposition that a great deal of what the Government have done recently lacks real substance. 
 The schedule purports to amend, repeal or otherwise change provisions from previous legal enactments. I would understand if that raft of changes and amendments were being made to Acts of Parliament from many years ago. However, it fiddles about with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—another flagship policy—and with the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. More than 100 parts of that Act are being fiddled with, yet it is only two years old—little more than half an hour old in most people's minds. 
 The Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act 2000 is being altered, mucked about and fiddled with in the schedule, as is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I notice on page 260 the provision that 
''in section 111 (minimum of three years for third domestic burglary) subsection (3) is omitted.''
 I wonder whether the Minister can explain exactly what is going on so far as that subsection is concerned? 
 I remember the much-vaunted proposition that under section 111 a mandatory sentence would be imposed in relation to offences of domestic burglary on three separate occasions. How important has that section been? On 21 January, I asked the Minister how many defendants had, pursuant to that vital section, been given the mandatory sentence since it was first introduced. Shall we run a sweepstake on the answer? It was six. That is what that section has done. Has it resulted in many more such sentences? The answer to which I have just referred is three weeks old, and much may have happened in those three weeks. However, on the face of it, this terrific section has resulted in six such sentences. What effect will line 213 on page 260 have on that? 
 I am reminded of other matters, and I should like to ask the Minister whether they are dealt with in the schedule, as I cannot find them. They relate to some of the Government's other flagship policies on sentencing. One in particular, under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, is the vital measure—I was told at the time—of a restraining order for sexual offenders. I asked three weeks ago—so, again, much might have happened in the interim—how many orders had been imposed under that amazing section. None. It must deal with other matters. 
 Is there a reference in the schedule—I cannot see it—to travel restriction orders, which were vital as measures to deal with certain drug trafficking cases? The Minister will recall that they were to be imposed under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. Is that being repealed? It might well be the case that it ought to be, given that—the Minister might not be surprised to know—since its inception the total number of such orders made pursuant to that flagship legislation has been none. Can he confirm that no travel restriction orders have been made? 
 I wonder whether another measure is being repealed. It is the recent provision under section 62 of the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000, with which the Minister will be familiar, encouraging courts—I remember how important the policy was deemed to be at the time—to make orders depriving those who have breached community service orders of benefit, or making orders reducing the benefit. What an important provision that was. Has it been amended in any way under the 100 or more amendments under the schedule? I asked the Government some time ago how many such orders had been made by the courts, how many persons had been affected and the total sums that had been recovered. You will be very surprised to hear, Mr. Illsley, that some 35 days after my asking, answer from the Government has come there none. I do not think that they have the slightest idea whether any orders have been made or whether any money has been recovered. They are limping from week to week unable to answer the question. 
 I have asked the Minister specific questions in relation to certain penalties, which I hope he will answer. I also direct him to page 257 and ask him to explain what is meant by the phrase 
''In section 12 (absolute and conditional discharge), subsection (4) (duty to explain effect of order for conditional discharge) is omitted.''
 My problem is that I have to read the words as they are and understand them in plain English. My first reaction is that the words appear to say that there is now an absence of duty to explain what a conditional discharge is—but no. I did not think so, and I see that the Minister is shaking his head. I blame myself entirely for reading the Bill and believing that it means what it appears to say. If, in future, the effect of a conditional discharge will always have to be carefully explained to the defendant, I understand the position.

Dominic Grieve: The purpose of schedule 21 is to make a wide range of amendments relating to sentencing. I was struck, however, that at a time when we are trying to modernise our wording—indeed, some comments have been made during our debates about the need for modern wording—amendment No. 875 amends the Vagrancy Act 1824 to replicate the words:
''It shall be lawful for any justice of the peace to impose on such person (being thereof convicted before him by his own view, or by the confession of such person, or by the evidence on oath of one or more credible witnesses) a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.''
 That is the apogee of 21st-century drafting. It is remarkable that, having chosen to amend the law, we should then preserve the language in its entirety. As my hon. Friend the Member for Woking rightly said, we are at that anomaly stage in our consideration of the Bill. We have considered hundreds of amendments—I hope that we have succeeded in doing justice to them without taking up too much time—to bring this legislation in line with that which already exists, so I suppose we are bound to encounter such examples.

Hilary Benn: That was an interesting set of speeches. We heard an uncharacteristic contribution from the hon. Member for Woking, which was not in keeping with the tone of the rest of his helpful contribution, because he is always helpful in our deliberations. [Hon. Members: ''Hear, hear.''] I shall chide him gently for that, because before I went through that long list—I apologise for the speed at which I read, but I did not want to take up too much time—I set out the reasons for the changes contained in the amendments that we have agreed.
 I want to reassure the hon. Member for Woking on the two points that he raised, one of which was the reference in paragraph 66 to omitting subsection (3). That and the other example to which he drew attention are covered by clause 157, which we have already agreed. The only reason for the change is to introduce a much wider duty to give reasons. The other orders to which he referred and the relevant section of the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 are not amended by the schedule. 
 I get the impression that Opposition Members feel that, once legislation has been changed, there should be a ban on changing it again for a fixed period. I simply do not accept that argument, because it does not make sense. Part of the duty of any Government is 
 to listen to representations, identify the problems that people in the community are concerned about and respond appropriately. Part of the irritation that the hon. Gentleman expresses may arise— 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman proceeded to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Schedule 21, as amended, agreed to. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time.

Clause 252 - Interpretation of Part 12

Amendments made: No. 699, in 
clause 252, page 138, line 19, leave out 
 'does not include a court-martial' 
 and insert 
 '(without more) does not include a service court'.
 No. 752, in 
clause 252, page 138, line 34, at end insert— 
 ' ''default order'' has the meaning given by section (Power to impose unpaid work requirement or curfew requirement on fine defaulter)(3);'.
 No. 698, in 
clause 252, page 139, line 16, at end insert— 
 ' ''service court'' means— 
 (a) a court-martial constituted under the Army Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.18), the Air Force Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.19) or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c.53); 
 (b) a summary appeal court constituted under section 83ZA of the Army Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.18), section 83ZA of the Air Force Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.19) or section 52FF of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c.53); 
 (c) the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; 
 (d) a Standing Civilian Court; 
 ''service disciplinary proceedings'' means— 
 (a) any proceedings under the Army Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.18), the Air Force Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c.19) or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c.53) (whether before a court-martial or any other court or person authorised under any of those Acts to award a punishment in respect of any offence), and 
 (b) any proceedings before a Standing Civilian Court;'.
 No. 636, in 
clause 252, page 139, line 38, leave out '206' and insert '207'.
 No. 637, in 
clause 252, page 139, line 40, leave out from 'section' to end of line 44 and insert— 
 '(c) a sentence falls to be imposed under section 206 if, because the court is of the opinion mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of that section and considers that the case falls within subsection (2) or (3) of that section, the court is obliged to pass a sentence complying with that section, and 
 (d) a sentence falls to be imposed under section 208 if, because the court is of the opinion mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i) and (ii) of that section, the court is obliged to pass a sentence complying with that section.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 252, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 253 to 255 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 256 - Reporting restrictions for

Amendments made: No. 748, in 
clause 256, page 141, line 11, at end insert— 
 '(7A) In paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 41(1) (restrictions on reporting) for ''Great Britain'' there is substituted ''the United Kingdom''.'.
 No. 749 in 
clause 256, page 141, line 13, at end insert— 
 '(9) In Schedule 4 (modifications for Northern Ireland) paragraph 16 is omitted.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 256, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 257 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Adjourned at twenty-six minutes past Eleven o'clock till this day at half-past Two o'clock.